

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

057-13147A7

INFORMATION  
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ACTION: A-UR/3

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TOP  
SECRET

2720

Frankfurt via War

Dated February 7, 1946

Rec'd 11:39 a.m., 8th

Secretary of State

Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE

HIACR 36, February 7, 11 P.M. (SECTION FOUR)

and passed him intelligence which Geyencho placed at the disposal of the German Secret Service. I also know that Seebach and Geyencho maintained a close working relationship; the plot I was not able to describe.

At the end of 1942 I resumed contact with Geyencho in Berlin and had various interviews with him. I also arranged visit to Heinrich Himmler in the latter's command post on the eastern front. In all conversations Geyencho warned against the false German church policy, since by it Germany was in danger of losing the sympathies of Latin America; Himmler, however, was clever enough to shift the theme of conversation to the common front in the fight against Bolshevism. A further topic of these conversations was the installation of a permanent airline between Spain and Argentina with German aid. After his departure from Germany, and I believe, a brief sojourn in Rome, Geyencho settled temporarily in Spain, where he maintained connections with the German Secret Service.

Six. In the consummation of its relations to Germany the Argentine Govt used two channels, on the one hand to try and buy arms from Germany on the other to manifest their will for neutrality. For the one line the connection to the German Secret Service was used, and apparently Omar Alberto Hellmuth was decided upon as the responsible man for this line. The German Embassy was used for the second line of communications. All this went on in the last half of 1943.

After Hellmuth's

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-2- WIAOW 36, February 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION FOUR) from  
Frankfurt via Wam.

After Hellmuth's arrest in England towards the end of 1943, Becker was informed of the failure of this mission by the Argentine Gerni, who then Becker. In turn informed Berlin. We supposed at that time, that the failure of Hellmuth's mission had been caused by talk that was at least careless (?) the German society, apparently especially through the jealousy of one of their collaborators, Freude. A controversy started with the Foreign Office (Auswaertiges Amt) about this incident, since they accused the German Secret Service of having carried out policies of their own, Eigenmachtige Politik and further that they had been the real cause of the later break in relations. Ribbentrop accused the Secret Service in particular that Hellmuth was an "agent provocateur" who was using the German Secret Service to disturb his, Ribbentrop's personal policy in Argentine.

Seven. Becker always had excellent connections to the highest military places. It was because of these connections that Becker later, i.e. after the break in relations, succeeded in reestablishing Secret Service contacts in the shortest time. These conditions were also responsible, that in spite of the break of relations with Germany, because of the basic political attitude of Peron and Farrell, the German Secret Service could continue to work there, and that in general the treatment of Germans was more benevolent than before. According to reports which the SD received in Berlin, Peron and Farrell were not indisposed to negotiate with the reestablishment of relations.

Eight. From our own reports as well as from general manifestations it appeared time and time again that Peron's philosophy was based on a "National" Socialism. ("Das Peron auf dem Boden eines 'nationalen' sozialistischen stand"). He was endeavoring to create a strong Argentine in order to get the upper hand in the various currents of South America. On account of his basic political attitude Peron was always inclined to realize a collaboration with Germany.

Nine. The

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Frankfurt via War.

Nine. The aforementioned facts conform to the truth.  
These declarations were made by me voluntarily and without  
compulsion, and I have read and signed them. Signed  
Walter Schellenberg. Subscribed and sworn to before First  
Lt. Atwood Collins, Nurnberg, Germany, 6th February, 1946.  
Statement End.

END OF MESSAGE.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

(\*) Apparent omission

HLF

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